Mumbai Attacks Geopolitical Implications

Geopolitical Analysis of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26 - 27 Nov, and my comments on them

Summary

If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.

Analysis

At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.

We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.

Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government's internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.

That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government's domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.

If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.

There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.

In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.

It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn't matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities.. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.

This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don't know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren't involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.



My Comments:-


Well, theoretically all this sounds quite plausible. But when viewed in the perspective of precedence, the possible scenario that emerges is quite different from the doomsday predictions of this analyst.

Firstly, this is one more in an unending series of such attacks, which have been escalating in scale and audacity. One more media tamasha, accompanied by the usual platitudes mouthed by politicians of all hues, as has already been witnessed. Given the size of this one, and the fact that it is still going on, they have so far restrained from finger pointing and scoring political brownie points. But once it is over, the blame game will start. Both the major political alignments will spew venom at each other, while claiming to be the sole saviours of civilization as we know it. And yes, collectively Pakistan will be blamed (and as I am sure all of us are convinced, not without reason or substance). It is another matter that WHICH ENTITY in Pakistan is actually to blame is anybody's guess. In all probability, their government is as helpless and clueless, or maybe just a degree less so, than ours. The genie is out of the bottle, and having granted three wishes, refuses to go back. It is now tormenting its masters and everyone else.

So, while Pakistan will be blamed, and the usual statements and denials will follow, each side pandering to its domestic audience. But it will remain at a slanging match, as both sides know they can not afford to escalate the situation. A very optimistic view is that it might even prompt the Pakistani government to overtly or covertly attempt to tighten the screws on the forces of terrorism (to what effect is anybody's guess).

USA will also make all the right noises, and do everything short of acting against Pakistan. After all, Mumbai is not New York, and the Taj is not the WTC.

Both India and USA are heading for a change of government in the near future, with the same preceded by elections in the case of India. Under such circumstances, it would be foolish to expect decisive, precipitative action by either of them. So, we will declare war on terrorism (yet again!), vow to hunt down the perpetrators (they are dead) and the one's behind them (you have a hope coming!) 'irrespective of their religion'. We will call endless meetings, probably initiate actions to raise new agencies or forces (thereby providing more avenues for babus and policemen to rise in life). That the existing agencies are numerous enough to cause considerable confusion and afford leeway for blame shifting doesn't matter.

Then, life will go on. Till the next time there is another attack and we once again dedicate ourselves to eradicating terrorism from its roots, no matter what the cost.

Sorry for sounding so cynical – maybe optimism will return with normalcy in Mumbai.

Constitutional Crisis - Threat Vs Reality

The recent actions by the service chiefs, wherein the implementation of the pay commission recommendations were put on hold till a final decision on the anomalies is taken by the governemnt, has drawn considerable comment and flak from a section of the media. Similarly, the Naval and Army Chiefs' communication to their respective commands, informing them of this delay, has been criticized. The critics have termed their actions as 'defiance' and 'insubordination'. Fears have been expressed that such an unprecedented move, if left unchallenged and unpunished, would embolden future chiefs. It may the constitutional order .... maybe even the dreaded C word!

The voices, apparently inspired by motivated interests, are crying wolf about something which may happen in the future . What about what is already happening for the past so many years - isn't the bureacracy already undermining the system for their personal gains every day?

A simple exercise will tell you the difference between the military and the bureaucrats. Go down to NOIDA. First visit Sector 15A - the abode of babus (old babus never retire - they just step into other roles to continue receiving government patronage). Notice the houses, the parks, the cars. Now drive on further to Sector 28 where the retired faujis are fading away. Notice anything? Any differences? These are not the palatial bungalows like you saw a little while back. Why? aren't the two services supposed to be paid similarly? Where does the difference lie?

The fact is that the bureaucrats are eating their way into a plush lifestyle - at the cost of the nation. Where is the sacntity of the constitution that these people keep beating their collective breasts about?

Chief's Actions - Inspired by Loyalty

The action (actually, inaction) of the service chiefs with regards to implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations has drawn flak from several quarters. It is being viewed by the critics as insubordination, indiscipline. Fingers are also being raised on the propriety of sending out signals to all ranks informing them of the delay.

The fact of the matter is that the politicians and the bureaucrats have been caught in flagrante delicto in their attempt to rush through the implementation, warts and all. This, despite that it has been pointed out that the final recommendations have glaring discrepancies as regards the armed forces. The inexplicable down gradation of Lt Cols and Lt Gens, and the reduction in pension of the jawans, defy logic and cannot stand scrutiny. Interestingly, these discrepancies were not part of the original pay commission report, but were introduced by the Committee of Secretaries during review.

Attempts to browbeat the services into accepting the award along with discrepancies, with the unconvincing assurance of looking into the issues post implementation, did not work. The principled stance of the chiefs, uncharacteristic of the incumbents in recent years, took them by surprise. The chiefs probably realized that once implemented, the urgency in rectifying the discrepancies would no longer exist, and the issue would get mired in typical bureaucratic delaying tactics. It is notable that the anomalies of the fourth and fifth pay commissions have still not been removed. The lowered status and pensions of the armed forces would have similarly become fait accompli.

Ethos of the armed forces is centred around loyalty – a concept difficult to understand for outsiders in today’s self serving opportunistic environment. Loyalty in the forces has many dimensions – loyalty towards the country, towards the services, towards one’s unit or ship, your superiors – and most importantly, towards the men under your command. The ‘Chetwoode Motto’ is deeply ingrained in the psyche of every officer :-

"The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time.

The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next.

Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time."

The stance taken by the service chiefs is in pursuit of these ideals. Individually, the chiefs have no personal stake in the removal of the anomalies. They have been well compensated in the pay commission report. On the contrary, in taking a strong stance, they have possibly staked their personal self interests such as post retirement appointments. It is only their strong sense of loyalty to their subordinates that prompted this action.

Unlike all other services affected by the pay commission, the armed forces have no unions, no associations. The jawans and officers have absolutely no mechanism of expressing their dissatisfaction with the pay commission discrepancies. They would have no option but to ‘lump it’. Life would carry on, the soldiers and officers would continue to spill their blood securing this nation. But, as the chiefs are well aware, it would be yet another blow to the already beleaguered edifice of the morale of the services, another threat to its basic fabric.

The move to withhold the implementation till a final decision on the anomalies was the only way the import and urgency of the issue could have been highlighted, since all other quarters had only drawn assurances. It also made administrative sense, since it would avoid having to do the salary calculations of more than 15 Lakh people twice in (hopefully) a month or so.

As regards the signal informing their command of the delay in implementation, it was perfectly in order to keep all ranks of the services informed about an issue that every one of them is obviously monitoring closely and is affected by. This is as per the best practices of command, to avoid rumour mongering and ensuring the correct picture is known to all.

The chiefs were sanguine that loyalty to the nation lay in being loyal to their services and their subordinates, and acted accordingly, even at potentially grave personal costs. It is probably for the first time, after the late Field Marshal Manekshaw insisted on delaying the commencement of operations in 1971 till the army was fully ready, that such a principled and selfless stance has been taken by any service chief. They have lived up to the line in the NDA Prayer – “Help me to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong.”The nation, media and the government must view their actions in this light, and not now go on a witch hunt, lest they cause irreparable damage to the morale of the armed forces.